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ABSTRACT 
Customer preference information is of great importance for vendors to carry out price discrimination and targeted marketing. 
Advanced Internet technologies, especially web 2.0 and web-economy, have been provided accessibility and allowed vendors  
to acquire these information by the user-community and online personalization technologies. This study investigates an 
information market where the complementary firm pays to the vendor to indirectly acquire the customer preference  
information, which could be costly to acquire. We develop an economic model to examine vendor’s optimal information 
acquisition and sharing strategies under horizontal relationship under different payment formats of the complementary firm (i.e. 
fixed-fee or service-rate payment). We show that both payment formats improve the basic personalization service, and the  
basic personalization service is equal under two payment cases, but the extra personalization service under fixed-fee payment   
is higher than that under the service-rate payment. Nevertheless, the vendor’s equilibrium benefits are improved with 
information sharing under both payment formats. Moreover, although the complementary firm would get zero benefits under 
fixed-fee payment and positive benefits under service-rate payment, the customer preference information can be acquired   
under both cases. Our findings not only help researchers interpret why the vendors implement information sharing strategies,  
but also assist practitioners in developing better social commerce and cooperation strategy. The implications of this paper can 
shed light on how firms interact under horizontal relationship where a vendor possesses information superiority. 
 
Keywords: personalization service, information sharing, complementary firm, horizontal relationship, privacy concerns 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Complementary products are those for which a customer’s utility from using both of them together is greater than the sum of 
the utilities that he or she would have received from using each product separately [2] . Complementary relationships 
frequently arise in many industries. For example, the demands for home appliances are highly related to the home decorations. 
In fact, when customers buy the home appliances, the home decoration is also considered. This is because more utilities can be 
obtained from the combination of these two complementary products. Other examples of complementary products include the 
relationship between the iPhone and AT&T, computer hardware and software, etc. 
 
It has been widely recognized that customer preference information (CPI) is of great importance for vendors. In fact, the 
importance of customer preference information can be reflected in two aspects. On the one hand, this customer preference 
information can be used to design, innovate and improve products characteristics among complementary vendors in reality and 
can also be applied to carry out price discrimination and targeted marketing. On the other hand, through sharing the acquired 
information, a vendor can strategically influence its complementary firm’s behavior [16] under horizontal relationship. 
 
Advanced Internet technologies, especially web 2.0 and web-economy, have provided an accessibility and allowed vendors to 
offer online personalization (e.g. toolbars, DIY, The build-in, etc) to interact with customers to acquire CPI. Personalization, as 
a key interactive marketing strategy, is widely used in marketing areas. Imagine a vendor who becomes better informed of 
customer preference information through advanced network, user communities, online recommendation services, text mining 
technologies and online personalization technologies, etc. [20] [27] [41] [44] [45] . When the vendor uses the personalization 
service to acquire CPI for his own products, because of negligible cost of acquiring information based on these technologies,  
he may have the ability to simultaneously acquire this information for its complementary firm. Nevertheless, corresponding 
complementary firm may lack the necessary expertise and resources, and because of building a social platforms or interactive-
community may bear an enormous one-time investigate which cannot afford especially for many small and medium-sized 
emerging enterprises. Therefore, these firms may only use the traditional acquiring technologies (e.g. E-mail, Phone, fax, etc). 
For instance, Haier, as a famous household appliances vendor in China, sponsors the Casarte Community 
（www.casarte.cn/jzxjd.php）  and  interacts  with customers. The other example is  Siemens  which constructs the     Built-in 
community （diykitchen.siemens-home.cn） to acquire customer preference information. Both of communities simultaneously 
offer the services of home appliances and home decorations for customers. When customers participate in the community and 
use the personalization services, his or her preference information can be disclosed. This disclosed information includes not 
only the preference for household appliances （e.g. Haier or Siemens）, but housing-decoration which is most important for the 
complementary firms (e.g. housing-decoration firm or housing-design firm). In addition, many housing-decoration firms have 
realized that they are less informed about this preference information than the vendor （e.g. Haier or Siemens）. It is intuitive 
that if the vendor shares this information to its complementary firm, the extra payoff and higher satisfaction may be obtained 
from combination products, and that if these complementary firms acquire these preference information, R&D costs may be 
reduced and higher competitive advantage can be obtained. Consequently, it is wise for complementary firms to acquire this 
preference information shared by the vendor. 
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Considering the importance of customer preference information and the practice of information management under horizontal 
relationship, it is indispensable for firms to investigate the influence mechanism of information acquisition and sharing. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, few theoretical works have considered the possibility that there is an information 
market including a vendor who possesses information superiority and a complementary firm who lacks necessary customer 
preference information; that cooperation can exist between two firms under horizontal relationship; and that sharing modes  
may affect the firm’s acquisition strategies and benefits. Our research bridges between the theoretical and practical gap by 
proposing a complementary-service model. In this model, the vendor offers online personalization service to acquire customer 
preference information. And the complementary firm pays to the vendor to share this information. Through this model, we 
investigate the economic effects and payoff implications of both the vendor and the complementary firm under horizontal 
relationship. We address several questions that have not been analyzed in the literatures. 
 
RQ1: How many personalization services should be offered by the vendor? 
RQ2: How do patterns of payment affect the vendor’s acquisition strategies and benefits? 
RQ3: Which patterns of payment should be adopted and implemented by complementary firm? 
 
To answer these questions, we first consider two simple cases that each of firms acquires customer preference information 
alone. Taking these cases as the benchmark, we then investigate the case where the complementary firm pays to the vendor in 
two payment formats (fixed-fee or service-rate payment) to acquire preference information. In addition, under two payment 
formats, we respectively discuss how both payment formats affect the vendor’s acquisition strategies, in other words, how 
many personalization services should be offered in equilibrium, and how the strategies of payment influence the firms’ benefit. 
Moreover, we examine the equilibrium payoff for the complementary firm. Finally, through comparing the equilibrium results 
of two cases, we propose some interesting and optimal strategies for both firms. 
 
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we have developed a simple micro-model of customer utility for 
personalization service and preference information. Second, we identify the information trade-off faced by a vendor and a 
complementary firm. Finally, we have used this model to demonstrate how the payment formats affect firm’s optimal 
information acquisition strategies and equilibrium benefits. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In §2, we review and analyze the relevant literature. We describe the  
model to capture the interaction between the vendor and the complementary firm in §3. In §4, we present some preliminary 
results. The analysis of fixed-fee payment is addressed and the effects of service-rate payment case is further discussed in §5. 
In §6, we discuss the limitations and management implications. The last section concludes the paper and identifies potential 
directions for future research. All proofs of results are elaborated in the appendix. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study is related to the research on personalization, which have been extensively studied in recent years. The related 
personalization literature examines effects such as interactive marketing [32] [34] [35] [42], Customer Relationship 
Management [23], consumer responses and behavior [25] [21], E-commerce [5] [24] [26], user communities [44] etc. A 
comprehensive review of online personalization can be found in [36], which presents a framework for  personalization by  
taking an interdisciplinary approach in the management sciences and many interesting research directions in the interactions 
between a firm and other key players are proposed. Under the direction of this framework, [9] starts with an empirical study on 
personalization versus privacy. They pointed out that customers are willing to disclose their personal information in exchange 
for some economic or social benefits. Considering the privacy concerns, (Chellappa 2007) uses a formal economic model to 
demonstrate that the entire market is better off when both privacy contracts and usage enforcement are allowed by the regulator. 
[10] examines vendor strategies in a market where consumers have heterogeneous concerns about privacy. [33] demonstrate 
how cultural and generational influences on privacy concerns empirically. [37] propose a methodology that systematically 
considers privacy issues by using a step-by-step privacy impact assessment. By contrast to this stream of research on privacy 
concerns and personalization, this study extends the literature to a horizontal relationship between a vendor and a 
complementary firm and theoretically investigates effects of firms’ information acquisition and sharing strategies. 
 
This study is also closely related to the literature on information acquisition. Recently, the research of information acquisition 
mainly includes: economic perspective [3] [14] [15], operation research [12] [19] [30] [31], etc. Comparing these literatures of 
information acquisition, however, with the help of advanced network technologies (e.g. by using toolbar or sidebars to offer 
and design personalization services) to acquisition customer preference information is relatively new and important for 
management practice. Interacting with customers by effective personalization strategies, vendor not only increases its 
bargaining power [36], but also benefits itself through information sharing. Therefore, this study mainly focuses on online 
information acquisition through effective personalization technologies under horizontal relationship, to best of our knowledge, 
which is relatively new in the research of information acquisition. 
 
Another closely related literature stream is information sharing. Most literatures of information sharing appear in supply chain 
management. For example, value [22] [28] [46], competition [18] [29], trust [38], pricing and profits [13]. Many theoretical 
literatures of information acquisition demonstrate the benefits between upstream and downstream in supply chain management. 
[16] [17] show that the downstream retailer can be hurt by information sharing, but benefit the upstream vendor in a vertical 
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relationship. However, there are few studies that demonstrate the information sharing under horizontal relationship. Based on 
the product attribute and inter-enterprise cooperation, horizontal relationship is different from the vertical relationship in  
supply chain. In contrast, we examine information sharing from a vendor to its complementary firm under horizontal 
relationship. The complementary firm may prefer to acquire information, even if it is costly, because he cannot acquire the 
customer preference information by himself. Moreover, we examine how information sharing affects the vendor’s information 
acquisition strategies and benefits. 
 
THE MODEL 
To explore the efficacy of information acquisition strategies and patterns of payment, we consider a stylized model with two 
players: a vendor M who provides two associated personalization services to acquire customer preference information, and a 
complementary firm C who pays to obtain the customer preference information from vendor’s personalization service. We 
intend to investigate a three-period game where the complementary firm proposes a contract for information sharing modes, 
then the vendor observes the contract and accepts it and determines the personalization service to offer for customers, finally 
the CPI can be acquired and shared to the complementary firm. In this game, customers freely use the personalization service, 
disclosing his or her personal and preference information under privacy concerns. We assume that both of firms are risk neutral 
and maximize benefits. Therefore, there are three possible scenarios as detailed below and illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
 
Figure   1. A model with one vendor and one complementary firm 
Scenario 3 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume 
1. Scenario 1 — Vendor offers online personalization service 
 
S1    for customers to acquire CPI alone. 
2. Scenario 2 — Complementary firm uses the traditional technologies or services  S2 to acquire CPI alone. 
3. Scenario   3   —   Vendor   simultaneously   offers   personalization  services S1 & S2 to   customers   to   acquire  CPI. 
Complementary firm indirectly gets CPI from vendor offered online personalization service S2 . 
Scenario 1 & 2 are similar to the advertiser-portal model in [8] in terms of personalization and privacy, but they differ in that  
we focus on efficacy of information acquisition strategies and patterns of payment for two players under horizontal relationship. 
Scenario 3 is relatively innovative to the literatures. Therefore, in order to reveal the trade-off between the vendor and 
complementary firm, we take the Scenario 1 & 2 as a benchmark model. 
We assume Scenario 2 that is mainly based on the two considerations. On the one hand, firms build an online interactive 
platform , all the resources, service and management may be integrated in this huge systems and may need an enormous one-
time investigate which cannot afford. On the other hand, based on the consideration of complementary relationship, the 
complementary firm (e.g. small software enterprise and housing-decoration firm or housing-design firm), especially for many 
small and medium-sized emerging enterprises, can use the brand influence of vendor (e.g. Dell and Haier) to increase its 
competitiveness. 
 
To describe the customers’ complementary preference, we adopt the framework of complementary products established by [11] 
[39]. This framework reveals quantity of demands. In our model, the vendor uses online personalization technologies  to  
acquire CPI depending on how many such services can be offered and how much information is disclosed by customers. 
According to [7], this service-information mapping is given by g 1 (I )  S , where  I is customer’s preference information, 
S  is the online personalization services and g 1 ()  is the current state of personalization technologies. To make the model 
and analysis simple, we assume a unit of information leads to a single unit service (i.e. I  S ). Meanwhile, from [10], 
customer’s  utility  submits  to  an  inverted  U-shaped  function  in  personalization  service.  The  vendor  offers  two    online 
personalization services S1 & S2 ( S1  0, S2  0 ). Note that the basic personalization service S1    is used to acquire CPI for 
vendor  himself,  and  the  extra  personalization  service  S2 for  complementary  firm.  We  assume  that PC (PC    0) is the 
marginal value for personalization service and rC (rC  0) is the privacy cost coefficient of customer. Thus, a customer’s utility 
function from using personalization service can be represented as 
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1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( )C C CU S S P S S r S KS S S                   （1） 
 
Where (0 1)K K  measures the degree to which personalization services are complement. If parameter 0K  , the two 
personalization services are independent to each another. If 1K  , the two personanlization services are perfect complements. 
This structure of customer utility function has been widely utilized in economics, marketing, and operations management 
literature e.g. [1] [4] [43]. It is worth noting that the cross product 1 2S S  represents the complementarity of two personalization 
services corresponding products. When vendor adds the associated personalization service into its basic service, there is spillover 
effect emerging from the cross-product term for the customers of combination of personalization services, which leads a higher 
utility for customers. This spillover effect, however, may also lead customers to disclose more customer preference information 
and thus induce higher privacy cost. 
 
From the customer’s utility function (1), we calculate its bordered Hessian, due to 0 1K  , we have
2(2 ) 0H r K   , and
1 1
2 0S SU r   . Therefore, there is a local maximum value in this function. Moreover, the point 
* *
1 2( , )C CS S is a local 

















reveals a customer’s characteristic using the online personalization service and is a quanlitiative repersentation of the behavioral 
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, respectively. Due to privacy concerns, the online personalization service levels used by customers are not 
more than theirs optimal levels,（i.e. 
*
iC iCS S ）. In a word, a rational vendor would never offer services greater than optimal 
service level 
*
iCS  as no customer would find it optimal to use services beyond this level. 
 
This study deals with customer preference information, which the vendor can acquire through personalization services and share 
to its complementary firm. However, complementary firm should pay to the vendor to get this useful information. The 
complementary firm usually chooses between two payment formats (fixed-fee or service-rate) in reality. There are numerous 
examples of fixed-fee & service-rate pricing for information good e.g. long-distance telephone markets, advertising expense, 
anonymous text markets, internet services, etc. This represents situations where the vendor has superior access to service fit 











Stage 1 Stage 2 
Figure   2. Timing of the Model 
Stage 3 
 
The timing of the game for a decision cycle is shown in Figure 2. In the first stage, the complementary firm provides a contract 
to the vendor about the formats of payment and expenses of information sharing (i.e. fixed-fee  T  or service-rate  ). Namely, 
the format of payment is adopted by complementary firm to get the useful CPI through the personalization service S2   offered 
by the vendor. Observing the payment contract (i.e. fixed-fee & service rate) in the second stage, the vendor determines 
whether or not to accept the contract. If the complementary firm proposes a contract and the vendor accepts it, then the vendor 
should decide how many personalization  services S2 to offer to acquire the CPI for the complementary firm. Note that the 
vendor, on the  one  hand, should balance the benefit from the basic services and extra services and the cost for  offering         
S1 & S2 . On the other hand, considering the complementarities of customer demands, the vendor should coordinate the two 
associated personalization service S1 & S2 to maximize its benefit. In other words, the vendor would like to get more 
information disclosed by customers. Therefore, the vendor should balance both his own interests and complementary firm’s 
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interests in this stage and simultaneously decide the optimal personalization service level S1 & S2 . Both firms’ benefit 
function will be provided in Preliminaries section. In the third stage, the vendor would share the acquired information with the 
complementary firm according to the contract signed in the first stage, and then the trade-off is achieved. The complementary 
firm may then update its belief about the customer’s demand and assess the value of acquired information. To solve the game, 
we use backward induction to insure sub-game perfection. A summary of the model notation is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table   1. Summary of Model Notations 
 
Notation Explanation 
PC Customer’s marginal value for personalization services 
K Complementarities of two personalization service 
SiC 
rC 




Optimal service level used by customers(i=1,2) 
Customer privacy cost coefficient 
Customers’ utility from personalization service 
The basic personalization service which can be used to acquire CPI for the 
vendor 
The complementary personalization service which can be offered by the vendor 
and used to acquire CPI for complementary firm 
C Acquiring cost for the complementary firm by itself 
T Fixed-fee payment for the complementary firm 
 Service-rate payment for the complementary firm 
















The customer’s marginal distribution density 
The personalization service level without information sharing 
The vendor’s benefit without information sharing 
The personalization service level under the fixed-fee payment(i=1,2) 
The firm’s benefits under the fixed-fee payment(j=M,C) 
The personalization service level under service rate payment(i=1,2) 
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BENCHMARK MODELS 
Before we begin the main analysis, let us consider two benchmark cases. The first one presented in Scenario 1 is that vendor 
offers online personalization service 1S  to customers to acquire CPI alone. The customer’s utility function is reduced as
2








 , the optimal 
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R S f S dS S f S dS S     , where   represents vendor’s cost coefficient offering 








. Thus, there is no 














The  second  benchmark  case  presented  in  Scenario  2  arises  when  the  complementary  firm acquires  information through 
traditional  service  technologies  S2 (e.g.  marketing surveys,  purchase,  developing data-mining or  scientific   management 
software packages, etc), because of building a social platforms or interactive-community may bear an enormous one-time 
investigate which cannot afford especially for many small and medium-sized emerging enterprises. There are two realistic and 
interesting awkward situations faced by between customers and the complementary firm. From a customer perspective, following 
the privacy calculus theory, if the utility obtained from S2 is less than or equal to the privacy cost in this information exchange 
(i.e.U  0 ), none of customer would like to disclose the preference information to the complementary firm. Therefore, the 
information-service trade-off would not be arisen. 
 
From a complementary firm perspective, if the complementary firm wants to acquire information by himself, a number of 
expenses should be entailed. Therefore, even though the customer preference information is very significant, the complementary 
firm would have to be forced to abandon acquiring information under the exorbitant costs C . 
 
As a result, we assume no information would be also acquired by the complementary firm in Scenario 2. It is also clear that from 
these perspectives the information value is zero for the complementary firm (i.e.  N  0 ). It is wise for the complementary firm 
to develop new channels to acquire CPI. For example, many customers would be reluctant to disclose their preference 
information to one firm in real estate industries, but be willing to disclose preference information to other  real 
estate mediums. As a consequence, considering the complementarities of products or services and the limitation of   resources, 
the complementary firm turns to information superiority of the vendor to acquire information indirectly. This Scenario will serve  
as  the  benchmark  against   which  compare  the   acquiring  cost  to  the  complementary  firm’s  payments   (i.e.         C  T & 
C   S2 ) to acquire customer preference information in Scenario 3. 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Vendor and Complementary Firm Benefits  
In our model, there are no direct monetary payments from the customers. However, when customers use the personalization 
service offered by the vendor and disclose their preference information, the firms can derive value from this information. 
According to the previous studies (see Chellappa & Shivendu, 2007, 2010), customer information is acquired from two segments, 
the privacy seekers who are the most privacy-sensitive customers and the convenience seekers who are the least privacy-sensitive 
customers. To get the CPI from the vendor, the complementary firm may choose to simply pay the vendor the deterministic, pre-
specified price T ( 0T  ) or pay the vendor according to service-rate  ( 0  ). We use the superscripts F and V to denote 
the corresponding fixed-fee payment and service-rate payment, respectively, throughout this paper. We assume that other 
coefficients are common knowledge for firms. 
 
If the vendor offers personalization service 1 2&S S  to customers, we model the vendor and complementary firm’s benefits 
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
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R S f S dS S f S dS T

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
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C C C C C C
S
R S f S dS S f S dS S

                                   (5). 
 
Where 1 2&R R represent the vendor and complementary firm’s marginal value for customer preference information, respectively; 
function 
*( )iCf S  represents the customers’ marginal distribution density. Note that the two customers’ optimal service levels are 






































 , respectively. Based on [40] which observes a unique feature of information goods, 
namely near-zero or zero marginal production cost, we assume that the vendor’s production cost for offering online 
personalization service is zero and   represents the vendor’s cost coefficient such that the net costs are quadratic convex in the 
total amount of services offered. These costs reveal the vendor’s cost for collecting, storing, protecting, and transmitting the 
information. Noting that (2) & (4), the first term represents the value the vendor derives from the information obtained 
collectively from the customers, where the first integral formula indicates the amount of information disclosed by the privacy-
seekers and the second integral formula for convenience-seekers. The second term represents the total cost for offering the 
personalization service 1 2&S S . The third term represents the extra income from the complementary firm’s payment.  
 
We investigate how the vendor’s equilibrium acquiring strategies (i.e. 1 2&S S ) and information benefits are influenced by the 
complementary firm’s payment strategies (i.e. &T  ). We start with the fixed-fee payment when the complementary firm pays 
to acquire information from the vendor. Then, we derive the vendor’s equilibrium effects under service-rate payment. In each 
case, we also investigate how the complementarity K and cost coefficient   affect the vendor and complementary firm’s 
benefits and the vendor’s acquiring strategies.  
 
Fixed-Fee Payment 
We first start analysis with the scenario 3 when the fixed-fee payment is adopted by the complementary firm to indirectly acquire 
CPI through the personalization service 2S  offered by the vendor. If the vendor decides to accept to acquire information for the 
complementary firm, how does the payment strategy (i.e. fixed-fee payment) affect the vendor’s equilibrium personalization 
service level and the benefits? Moreover, how are the complementary firm’s benefits and payment affected by the 
complementarity K ? We now characterize the manufacturing and complementary firm’s optimal strategies and benefits in 
equilibrium as the following lemma. 
 





[(2 ) 4 ]
2[(2 ) 2 ]








, meanwhile, the corresponding optimal service level offered by the vendor will be 
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K R a K R b 
 
   
    
. 
 
Lemma 1 gives us the optimal decisions of the vendor and the complementary firm under the fixed-fee payment. As the 
complementary firm determines the fixed-fee payment contract, the vendor observes the contract and maximizes his own profit. 
Therefore, on the one hand, to get the information benefit, the vendor strategically offers the basic personalization service 1S to 
customers to acquire preference information; on the other hand, the vendor attempts to extract more surplus value by information 
sharing from the complementary firm’s payment. If the complementary firm earns negative profits from the information (i.e.
0FC  ), the trade-off would be ceased. Given the participation constraint, the complementary firm will set optimal fixed-fee
*T  in equilibrium to indirectly acquire the CPI from the vendor.  
 
We now turn our attention to the efficiency of acquiring strategies and two firm’s benefits under the fixed-fee payment. 
Comparing the benefits and personalization service level to the benchmark yields the following results. 
 
PROPOSITION 1. If the fixed-fee payment can be adopted by the complementary firm, in equilibrium: 
(1) The personalization service
1
FS offered by the vendor is higher than that non-information sharing (i.e. 1 1
F NS S ) and 
increasing in complementarity K and decreasing in cost coefficient   . 
 
(2) The personalization service 
2
FS  offered by the vendor is increasing in complementarity K and decreasing in cost coefficient
 . 
 
(3) The vendor’s benefit 
F
M is positive, increasing in the complementarity K and decreasing in cost coefficient  . 
 
(4) The vendor is better off with information sharing（i.e. 
F N
M M  ）. 
This proposition suggests that the fixed-fee payment positively affect the vendor’s basic personalization service
1
FS . This is 
because that to extract more fixed-fee from the complementary firm, the vendor increase
1
FS which leads to higher spillover 
effects and more information can be disclosed by customers. Thus the vendor can grab more surplus value from the 
complementary firm’s payment by information sharing. Moreover, if the vendor can motivate to increase two associated 
personalization service, it would influence customers to be more of convenience seekers rather privacy seekers in this customer 
market. In addition, the complementary firm pays fixed-fee T to the vendor for acquiring information, nevertheless, this 
information only stems from the personalization service 
2
FS offered by the vendor and the spillover effect from the 
personalization service
1
FS . Furthermore, the cost   for offering the personalization service increases, which leads both of 
service levels decrease. As the complementarities K of two personalization service increases, customers’ service demand also 
increases. Based on this observation, the vendor has a motivation to increase the two personalization service that spills over for 
both personalization services. Therefore, this spillover efficiency effect can be strengthened by the higher complementarity K. 
 
Proposition 1 also suggests that the vendor can benefit from information sharing. This is indicated by the difference in the 
complementary firm’s equilibrium fixed-fee payment between the sharing and non-sharing cases (i.e.
F N
M M  ). Without 
information sharing, the vendor obtains the benefits from the information value of basic personalization service
1
FS . When the 
vendor shares the information to the complementary firm, the fixed-fee T can be paid by the complementary firm; meanwhile, the 
extra personalization service 
2
FS can lead to spillover effect. On the contrary, the complementary firm cannot acquire the 
customer preference information by itself due to high cost or limited resources showed in Scenario 2. When the complementary 
firm pays to the vendor and indirectly acquires information, both of firms can achieve win-win. That is, the vendor improves the 
benefits, and the complementary firm gets the important preference information. Therefore, we get another important result as 
following. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. If the fixed-fee payment can be adopted by the complementary firm and the acquiring cost *C T , in 
equilibrium: 
(1) The complementary firm’s benefit from the value of information is zero, but the customer preference information can be  
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acquired from the vendor. 
 
(2) The one-time fixed-fee *T  paid by the complementary firm is increasing in complementarity K . 
 
When the complementary firm determines to pay the fixed-fee to the vendor for acquiring customer preference information, in 
equilibrium, the vendor can grab all the surplus value. That is, the complementary firm gets zero economic profits. In the game, 
the complementary firm, as a leader, would realize that the vendor could make a strategic decision to extract all surplus value. 
However, in order to acquire the information, it is inevitable that the complementary firm has to pay to the manufacture. It is 
because that the customer preference information, in reality, is costly to acquire. Even if spending more extra for the firms, some 
customers would be reluctant to disclose their preference information to firms. For example, in real estate industries, many 
customers would be reluctant to disclose their preference information to real estate developer, but be willing to disclose 
preference information to other real estate mediums. Therefore, although the information benefits are zero in this game, the 
complementary firm would use this preference information to design and improve its products or services, reduce R&D cost, and 
to carry out target marketing, etc. Compared with the benchmark, the complementary firm will obtain the customer preference 
information through the fixed-fee payment. 
 
The second point of this proposition is that the fixed-fee T paid by the complementary firm to acquire information is increasing 
with complementarities K of two personalization services. That is because the extra personalization service 
2
FS offered by the 
vendor can be spilled over the basic personalization service
1
FS . When customers have more complementary demands for the two 
services, because of the mutual spillover effect, more preference information can be disclosed by customers, and thus the 
complementary firm should pay more to obtain this information. Therefore, the complementary firm’s fixed-fee is increasing in 
complementarity K .  
 
Service-Rate Payment 
In this section, we investigate how the service-rate payment may influence the manufacturing and complementary firm’s 
equilibrium behaviors and benefits. Similarly, we first provide the firm’s equilibrium strategies under the service-rate payment. 
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, respectively. 
 
When the complementary firm adopts service-rate payment to acquire customer preference information, as a leader, he knows that 
given an announced service-rate , the vendor will strategically maximize her own profits. Under the service-rate payment, on 
the contrary, the complementary firm strategically decides on the service-rate   to be paid to the vendor. However, the vendor 
would not only consider benefits from the service-rate payment, but also the spillover effect. Based on these characteristics, the 
optimal personalization service levels can be offered to customers by the vendor. From the Lemma 2, there are several important 
results given as follows. 
 
PROPOSITION 3. If the service-rate payment can be adopted by the complementary firm, in equilibrium, 
(1) The personalization service 
1
VS offered by the vendor is also higher than that non-information sharing (i.e. 1 1
V NS S ), and 
increasing in complementarity K and decreasing in cost coefficient  . 
 
(2) The personalization service 
2
VS  offered by the vendor is increasing in complementarity K and decreasing in cost coefficient
 . 
 
(3) The vendor’s benefit 
V
M  is positive, increasing in the complementarity K and decreasing in cost coefficient  . 
 
(4) The vendor is better off with information sharing（i.e. 
V N
M M  ）. 
 
Similar to the case with fixed-fee payment, the basic personalization service level
1
VS offered by the vendor is higher than that  
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non-information sharing case. This proposition further confirms that the payment formats can positively affect the basic 
personalization service level. In addition, the personalization service levels in equilibrium are increasing in the complementarity 
K and decreasing in cost coefficient  . This is because as the acquiring cost C increases, the vendor’s benefits decrease. 
Therefore, the vendor is willing to reduce the service levels.  
 
Proposition 3 also suggests that the vendor is better off with information sharing. This is because that the extra benefits can be 
paid by the complementary firm. Therefore, the rational vendor can influence its complementary firm’s behaviors by information 
sharing and extract its surplus value. On the contrary, there is no other way for the complementary firm to pay to obtain customer 
preference information. The same as the case under the fixed-fee payment, the vendor’s equilibrium benefits 
V
M is related to the 
complementarity K and the cost coefficient  . As the complementarity K increases, the vendor’s benefits increases. Meanwhile, 
as the acquiring cost increase, the vendor’s benefits decrease. Finally, comparing the vendor’s equilibrium benefits to the 
benchmark case, it is easy to confirm that the vendor’s equilibrium benefits under the service-rate payment are higher than the 
non-information sharing case（i.e. 
V N
M M  ）. That is the vendor is better off with information sharing. 
 
PROPOSITION 4. If the service-rate payment can be adopted by the complementary firm and the acquiring cost
*
2
VC S , in 
equilibrium: 
(1) The service-rate *  paid by the complementary firm is increasing in complementarity K . 
 
(2) The complementary firm’s benefit 
V
C  from the value of information is positive, increasing in complementarity K; and the 
customer preference information can be also acquired from the vendor. 
 
Compared with the fixed-fee payment case, two results pertaining to the effect of service-rate in information sharing emerge from 
this proposition. First, in contrast to the fixed-fee payment case, service-rate is also positively related to the complementarity K. 
This is because that higher complementarity K leads to higher spillover effect and thus higher payment. As a result, the 
complementary firm would pay more, and get more information. Second, with the motivation of acquiring more information from  
 
the customers, it is wise to increase the service levels for the vendor and further to extract more payoff. Therefore, higher 
personalization service level leads to higher service-rate. 
 
When the service-rate payment would be chosen to acquire customer preference information, the complementary firm’s 
equilibrium information benefits are positive and increasing in complementarity K. If the complementary firm’s acquiring cost
*
2
VC S , he adopts the service-rate payment   to indirectly acquire customer preference information from the 
personalization service offered by the vendor; compared with the benchmark case, the complementary firm can obtain this 
information as well. At the same time, the complementary firm can get positive value of information through the information 
sharing.  
 
Finally, compared with the equilibrium service levels offered by the vendor and equilibrium benefit across the different payment 
formats cases yields the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 5. (1) The equilibrium personalization service level 1
VS  offered by the vendor under the service-rate payment is 
equal to 
1
FS  under the fixed-fee payment (i.e. 1 1 1
V F NS S S  ). 
 
(2) The equilibrium personalization service level 
2
VS  offered by the vendor under the service-rate payment is lower than that 2
FS
under the fixed-fee payment (i.e.
2 2
V FS S ). 
 
(3) The vendor’s equilibrium benefit under the service-rate payment is lower than that under the fixed-fee payment (i.e.
N V F
M M M   ); moreover, the equilibrium fixed-fee




VT S ). 
 
(4) The channel’s total equilibrium benefit under the service-rate payment is higher than that under the fixed-fee payment (i.e.
N N F F V V
M C M C M C      ). 
 
Proposition 5 suggests that through comparing the two payment formats, the basic personalization service level under the service- 
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rate payment is equal to the fixed-fee payment case (i.e.
1 1
V FS S ). This is because that the basic personalization service is used 
to acquire information for the vendor, but the extra personalization service for the complementary firm. Thus the payment formats 
cannot affect the basic personalization service levels. Note that the vendor should pay more attentions on the extra personalization 
service, and coordinate two associated personalization services. However, the extra personalization service level under the 
service-rate payment is lower than that under the fixed-fee payment (i.e.
2 2
V FS S ). This is because that the basic personalization 
services may be only used to acquire CPI for the vendor and the extra personalization service for the complementary firm. In 
order to extract all surplus value of information, the vendor strategically determines the optimal extra personalization service level. 
Furthermore, the vendor increases benefit through adding extra personalization service into the basic personalization service, 
which leads spillover effects, and extracting more payoff from the complementary firm. On the contrary, the complementary firm 
realizes the vendor strategic behaviors and has a motivation to reduce the payment; the personalization service level offered by 
the vendor is decreased.  
 
In addition, the vendor’s equilibrium benefit under the service-rate payment is lower than that under the fixed-fee payment. This 
is because that under the fixed-fee payment, the vendor may strategically grab all surplus value of information from the 




VT S ). That is why many complementary firms widely adopt the service-rate or utility-based 
payment to acquire information (e.g. advertising industries) in reality. Therefore, the complementary firm chooses which format 
of payment depending on not only the importance of CPI for producing and designing to satisfy customer’s tastes, but also the 
value of customer preference information for increasing benefit. 
 
Proposition 5 further confirms that although the extra personalization service level under the fixed-fee payment is higher than that 
under the service-rate payment, the complementary firm under the service-rate payment not only acquires the customer preference 
information from the vendor’s information sharing, but also obtains a positive value of information. Consequently, the channel’s 
total equilibrium benefit is higher than that under the fixed-fee payment case. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
A central assumption in our model is that the complementary firm pays to the vendor to acquire customer preference 
information indirectly. In fact, purchasing information is wildly used by firms in reality. In this paper, we just adopt two 
universal payments (i.e. fixed-fee or service-rate payment) to investigate impacts of information acquisition strategies and 
information sharing between a vendor and a complementary firm. However, we present the acquiring cost first appeared in  
 
benchmark model which is just used to explain why the complementary firm adopts an indirect way of acquiring customer 
preference information from vendor. For example, in reality, because of high cost of information acquisition, many real estate 
developers cannot get customer preference information from customers themselves, but so many customers are willing to 
disclose their preference information to the real estate medium. 
 
One implicit assumption in our model is that the preference information acquired from the extra personalization service offered 
by the vendor is truly and completely shared to the complementary firm. In fact, this information is usually shared depended on 
the trust and risk assessment in reality, the sharing modes in this paper cannot be realistic. However, although it is worth noting 
that the purpose of this assumption is only to simplify and streamline the mathematical analysis, it would not affect the 
qualitative insights. Moreover, our analysis focuses on online environments, but the model cannot be only restricted to online 
personalization service. In addition, in our model we propose the privacy concerns which is beyond our main analysis. On the 
contrary, our focus is on the impact of payment formats on the vendor’s information acquisition and information sharing 
strategies and the impact on the firms’ equilibrium benefits under horizontal relationship. 
 
This study only considers the case that vendor and complementary firm are two different kinds of firms, and the vendor also 
has ability to acquire customer preference information through the effective personalization technologies. Therefore, another 
interesting issues is when the two kinds of firms have the same or different capability in acquiring customer preference 
information by online personalization service, whether the results showed in this paper may be different under this condition or 
not. This is our next step work to examine. 
 
Implications for Theory 
From a theoretical point of view, this study contributes to research in information sharing under horizontal relationship. 
Chellappa & Shivendu (2006) consider representative of portals (e.g. AOL &Yahoo) possess vast advertising and customer 
profiling abilities. These portals use the acquired customer preference information either to get income from advertisers or to 
develop online tools for targeted advertising and one-to-one marketing. Galbreth, Ghosh, & Shor ( 2012)  examine the effect  
of social sharing for information goods. They point out that a firm can benefit from increased social sharing if the level of 
sharing is already high. Different from these literatures, we focus on the customer’s complementary demands in reality, which 
results in the possibilities for cooperation. Our results show that if the vendor shares the acquired information to the 
complementary firm, extra benefits can be obtained. Moreover, the complementary firm can get the customer preference 
information. The intuition supporting this solution is that no prices can be charged for personalization service, firms derive 
value from customer preference information. 
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Furthermore, this work enriches and extends the privacy calculus theory (PCT) in IS research. The broadest and most  
important contribution of this work is integrating customer’s privacy concerns into firm’s information acquisition decision. 
Such integration is a key contribution and way to advance secience. Li (2012) reviews fifteen established theories in online 
information privacy research. Smith & Dinev (2011) review the information privacy research by an interdisciplinary 
perspective. Pavlou (2011) evaluates the current state of the IS literature on information privacy (where are we now?) and 
identifies promising research directions for advancing IS research on information privacy (where should we go?). These 
researches point out that information privacy refers to the concept of controlling how one’s personal information is acquired 
and used. When customers disclose information to the firms, an individual’s intention is based on a calculus of behavior which 
is the risk-benefit analysis, where the trade-offs between expected risks and expected benefits are considered within a  specific 
information-disclosure context. Based on the privacy calculus theory, we build a simple micro-model of customer utility for 
personalization service and preference information, which can be used to reveal benefit-risk relationship between customers’ 
information disclosure and privacy concerns. Our study shows that the vendor may balance and coordinate the two associated 
personalization services to lead customers disclosing more information. The customer, however, would strategically use the 
personalization service offered by the vendor and disclose information under privacy concerns. 
 
In sum, this study examines the benefits of information sharing under horizontal relationship and demonstrates the importance 
of PCT in IS research, increases our understanding of sharing strategies and user-adoption and behaviors, and contributes to  
the growing body of research on online personalization and privacy concerns. 
 
Implications for Practice 
Several managerial implications result from our analyses. Firstly, our findings show that the vendor is better off with 
information sharing under two payment formats. Because of the complementary demands, the customer disclosed information 
is important for both the vendor and its complementary firms. If the vendor, as an only information superiority side, shares 
partial information to its complementary firm, she can obtain extra payment and thus increase benefits. Therefore，the 
economic force underlying this result conveys that the vendor has a motivation to share information acquired from customers  
to the complementary firm. Secondly, the vendor can strategically influence the complementary firm’s behavior (e.g. free-
riding). Through information sharing, the vendor may filtrate cooperative partner, and thus extract economic payoff from the 
complementary firms. In the contrary, in order to get competitiveness and reduce market uncertainty, it is wise for the 
complementary firm to acquire information indirectly from its partner. Thirdly, this study points out that the service-rate 
payment is an optimal strategy for the complementary firm. That is because the complementary firm not only obtains the 
customer preference information, but also gets a positive benefits from this information. This result is consistent with 
Sundararajan (2004), which points out that if the marginal cost component does not exist, then a fully revealing, purely usage- 
 
based contract becomes optimal. Therefore, this result also provides a basis for the complementary firm who chooses the 
format of payment. 
 
CONCLISIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we theoretically investigate the impact of modes of information sharing on the firm’s equilibrium acquisition 
strategies and benefits under horizontal relationship. Two payment formats (i.e. fixed-fee or service-rate payment) for information 
sharing are identified. We present several interesting results that provide management insights into information interaction 
between the complementary firms in markets characterized by complementary demands, strategies of information acquisition, and 
information sharing. 
 
First, this paper demonstrates that although both personalization services, in equilibrium, are higher than that in benchmark case, 
basic personalization service level is equal to that under two payment formats. Moreover, the extra personalization service level 
under the fixed-fee payment is higher than that under the service-rate payment case. This suggests that the vendor should be more 
cautious in balancing two levels of personalization service and make efforts to coordinate the extra personalization service for 
acquiring more information disclosed by customers and thus extract more payoffs from the complementary firm. In other words, 
in order to ensure to acquire a given amount of information from the basic  personalization service, the vendor should balance the 
extra personalization service level to acquire information for the complementary firm and extract payoff to improve its benefits. 
 
In addition, this study shows that the vendor is better off with information sharing under two payment formats. The economic 
force underlying this result conveys that the vendor has a motivation to share information acquired from customers to the 
complementary firm. It is important to emphasize that, on the one hand, the vendor’s benefits can be increased by information  
sharing; on the other hand, the vendor can strategically influence the complementary firm’s behavior (e.g. free-riding) [16]. For 
example, because of the complementarity of preference, many complementary firms have the opportunistic behaviors to reduce 
cost. As a result, although our focus here is the observability of the benefits of information sharing, the conceptual insights of this 
paper can be extended to more general situations when the cost and risk of information sharing cannot be neglected under 
horizontal relationship. 
 
The above insights provide prescriptions on how vendor should respond to changes in information acquisition and in information 
sharing arrangement. Under the fixed-fee payment, although all the value of information can be extracted by the vendor, the 
preference information would be acquired. Under the service-rate payment, the complementary firm can get the positive value of  
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information and obtain the customer preference information. Such theoretical insights suggest that to obtain the customer 
preference information, the complementary firm may find new channels and cooperative partners. With the help of cooperative 
partners’ information superiority, the complementary firm can get useful information and increase competitiveness. 
 
One direction for future research would be to consider other coordination mechanism that could be used to coordinate two 
personalization services offered by the vendor; meanwhile, other information sharing mechanism that the vendor decides when 
and how much information would share to the complementary firm. Another direction in which our study could be extended 
would be to relax the assumption that the characteristic of customers are uniformly distributed. Any other general distribution 
would be investegated, which would be more ture under the reality circumstances. 
 
APPENDIX.  
PROOFS OF LEMMAS AND PROPOSITIONS 
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                 (9) 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Due to the complementary firm proposes a contract, if the vendor accepts it and thus has a motivation of 
extracting all surplus value from complementary firm. Therefore, in equilibrium, the value of information obtained by the 
complementary firm is zero. That is, the fixed-fee is equal to the value of information. Otherwise, note that complementary firm’s 
profit function satisfies 0FC  , if the vendor wants to grab more surplus profit，complementary firm would discontinue the 
trade-off. We substitute the value of information (i.e. fixed-fee) in the vendor’s benefit function given by (6). Differentiating 
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, we can get
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differentiating
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. We can prove that 
1
FS is increasing in K and decreasing in  . (2) Similarly, by 
differentiating 
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, we can verified that 
2
FS is increasing in K and decreasing in  . (3) By differentiating 
F
M with respect to K and  , respectively, it is easy to confirm that the vendor’s benefits is increasing in K and decreasing in 
 
344
The Fifteenth International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 6-10, 2015 
 
 
Lv & Wan 
 . (4) Comparing the benchmark, it is easy to verify 0F NM M   .□ 
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. We have 
that the fixed-fee *T  paid by the complementary firm is decreasing in complementarity K . From the Lemma 1, it is easy to 
indicate that in equilibrium the complementary firm gets zero profit or surplus. It is because that all surplus value can be grabbed 
by the vendor. □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: By differentiating equation (8) with respect to 1S and 2S , respectively, and letting the first-order condition 
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clear that in equilibrium
1
VS is higher that 1
NS . Similar as Proposition1, it is clear that 1
VS  is increasing in K and decreasing in  .  
(2) Differentiating
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It is obvious that 0VM  , and 
V
M is increasing in K  and decreasing in cost coefficient  . (4) Comparing the benchmark, we 
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